## AC

God exists – 5 reasons.

**First**, Pascal’s Wager means any risk of God outweighs neg offense. **Kreeft 94** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

But **the only chance of doing infinite justice is if God exists and we believe, while the only chance of doing infinite injustice is if God exists and we do not believe.** If God does not exist, there is no one there to do infinite justice or infinite injustice to.

**Second** is the Cosmological argument. **Kreeft-2** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Everything that is has some adequate or sufficient reason why it is. Philosophers call this the Principle of Sufficient Reason. We use it every day, in common sense and in science as well as in philosophy and theology. If we saw a rabbit suddenly appear on an empty table, we would not blandly say, "Hi, rabbit. You came from nowhere, didn't you?" No, we would look for a cause, assuming there has to be one. Did the rabbit fall from the ceiling? Did a magician put it there when we weren't looking? If there seems to be no physical cause, we look for a psychological cause: perhaps someone hypnotized us. As a last resort, we look for a supernatural cause, a miracle, but there must be some cause. We never deny the Principle of Sufficient Reason itself. No one believes the Pop Theory: that things just pop into existence for no reason at all. Perhaps we will never find the cause but there must be a cause for everything that comes into existence. Now the whole universe is a vast, interlocking chain of things that come into existence. Each of these things must therefore have a cause. My parents caused me, my grandparents caused them, et cetera. But it is not that simple. I would not be here without billions of causes, from the Big Bang through the cooling of the galaxies and the evolution of the protein molecule to the marriages of my ancestors. **The universe is a vast** and complex **chain of causes. But does the universe** as a whole **have a cause?** Is there a first cause, an uncaused cause, a transcendent cause of the whole chain of causes? **If not, then there is an infinite regress of causes**, with no first link in the great cosmic chain. If so, then there is an eternal, necessary, independent, self-explanatory being with nothing above it, before it, or supporting it. It would have to explain itself as well as everything else, for if it needed something else as its explanation, its reason, its cause, then it would not be the first and uncaused cause. Such a being would have to be God, of course. **If** we can prove **there is such a first cause,** we will have proved **there is a God.** Why must there be a first cause? **Because if there isn’t then the whole universe is unexplained** and we have violated our Principle of Sufficient Reason for everything. **If there is no first cause, each particular thing in the universe is explained** in the short run, or proximately, **by some other thing, but nothing is explained** in the long run, or **ultimately**, and the universe as a whole is not explained.

**Third** is the ontological argument. **Plantinga 74** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

**There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.** And the analogues of (27) and (28) spell out what is involved in maximal greatness: (30) Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world. And (31) **Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence** in every world **only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world.** Notice that (30) and (31) do not imply that there are possible but nonexistent beings -- any more than does, for example, (32) Necessarily, a thing is a unicorn only if it has one horn. But if (29) is true, then there is a possible world *W* such that if it had been actual, then there would have existed a being that was omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect; this being, furthermore, would have had these qualities in every possible world. **So it follows that** if *W* had been actual, **it would have been impossible that there** be no such being. That is, if *W* had been actual, (33) “There **is no omnipotent**, omniscient, **and morally perfect being**” would have been an impossible proposition.

**Fourth** is the argument from mathematical reality. **Goldstein 10** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Mathematical truths are necessarily true.** (There is no possible world in which, say, 2 plus 2 does not equal 4, or in which the square root of 2 can be expressed as the ratio of two whole numbers.) The truths that describe our physical world, no matter how fundamental, are empirical, requiring observational evidence. (So, for example, we await some empirical means to test string theory, in order to find out whether we live in a world of eleven dimensions.) Truths that require empirical evidence are not necessary truths. (We require empirical evidence because there are possible worlds in which these are not truths, and so we have to test that ours is not such a world.) The truths of our physical world are not necessary truths (from 2 and 3).**The truths of our physical world cannot explain mathematical truths** (from 1 and 4). **Mathematical truths exist on a different plane** of existence from physical truths (from 5). **Only something which itself exists on a different plane of existence from the physical can explain mathematical truths** (from 6). 8. **[Therefore] Only god can explain mathematical truths** (from 7).

**Fifth**, Christianity is most likely correct. Only the existence of the Christian God can explain historical facts. For example, in the Old Testament there were over 300 prophesies made about Jesus hundreds of years before his birth, and every one was correct. The probability of any one man fulfilling just 8 of these prophesies by present day was found to be 1 in 10 to the 17th power. **Stoner and Newman** write[[5]](#footnote-5)

**Suppose** that **we take 1017 silver dollars and lay them on** the face of **Texas. They will cover all of the state two feet deep.** Now mark one of these silver dollars and stir the whole mass thoroughly, all over the state. Blindfold a man and **tell [a man]** him that he can travel as far as he wishes, but **he must pick** up **one** silver dollar and say that this is the right one. **What chance would he have of getting the right one? Just the same chance that the prophets would have had of writing these eight prophecies and having them all come true in any one man**, from their day to the present time, **providing they wrote using their own wisdom.**

When considering all 300 plus prophecies, the odds are even smaller.

**Stoner and Newman-2** explain5

There are more than three hundred prophecies dealing with Christ's first advent. If this number is correct, and it no doubt is, you could set your estimates ridiculously low on the whole three hundred prophecies and still obtain tremendous evidence of inspiration.

For example **you may place all of your estimates at one in four. You may say that one man in four has been born in Bethlehem: that one** of these children **in four was taken to Egypt,** to avoid slaughter; that one in four of these came back and made his home in Nazareth; that one in four of these was a carpenter; **that one in four** of these **was betrayed for thirty pieces of silver;** that one in four of these has been crucified on a cross; that one in four was then buried in a rich man's tomb; yes, **even that one in four rose from the dead** on the third day; **and so on for all** of the **three hundred prophecies and** from them I will **build a number much larger than the one** we obtained **from** the **forty-eight prophecies.**

The existence of God commits one to theological voluntarism. God’s will is the source of moral goodness – 8 reasons. **Murphy 12** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Some of the considerations in favor of metaethical theological voluntarism are historical. Both theists and nontheists have been impressed by the extent to which at least some **[First,] moral concepts developed in tandem with theological concepts, and** it may **therefore** be the case that **there could be no** adequate **explication of** some **moral concepts without** appeal to **theological ones.** On this view, **it is not** merely **historical accident that** at least some **moral concepts had their origin in** contexts of **theistic belief** and practice; rather, these concepts have their origin essentially in such contexts, and become distorted and unintelligible when exported from those contexts (see, for example, Anscombe 1958).

Theological considerations in favor of theological voluntarism Some of the considerations in favor of theological voluntarism have their source in matters regarding the divine nature. Several such arguments are summarized in Idziak 1979 (pp. 8–10). Some appeal to omnipotence: **[Second,] since God is** both **omnipotent** and impeccable, theological **voluntarism must be true: for** if God cannot act in a way that is morally wrong, then **God's power would be limited by other normative states of affairs** were theological voluntarism not the case. Some appeal to God's freedom: **[Third,] since God is free** and impeccable, theological **voluntarism must be true: for if moral requirements existed prior to God's will**ing them, requirements that an impeccable God could not violate, **God's liberty would be compromised. [Fourth,]** Some appeal to **God's status as supremely lovable** and deserving of allegiance: if theism is true, then **[means]** the world of **value must be** a **theocentric** one, **and so any moral view that does not place God at its center is** bound to be **inadequate.** Even if individually insufficient as justifications for adopting theological voluntarism, collectively they may suggest some desiderata for a moral view: that God must be at the center of a moral theory, and, in particular, that the realm of the moral must be dependent on God's free choices. It seems that any moral theory that met these desiderata would count as a version of theological voluntarism. Metaethical considerations in favor of theological voluntarism A third set of considerations in favor of theological voluntarism has its source in metaethics proper, in the attempt to provide adequate philosophical accounts of the various formal features exhibited by moral concepts, properties, and states of affairs. One might claim, that is, that theological voluntarism makes the best sense of the formal features of morality that both theists and nontheists acknowledge. Consider first the normativity of morals. **[Fifth,]** Both theists and nontheists have been impressed by the weirdness of normativity, with its very otherness, and have thought that whatever we say about **normativity**, it **will** have to **be** a story **not about natural properties but nonnatural ones** (cf. Moore 1903, section 13). John Mackie, an atheist, and George Mavrodes, a theist, have both drawn from this the same moral: if there is a God, then the normativity of morality can be understood in theistic terms; otherwise, the normativity of morality is unintelligible (Mavrodes 1986; Mackie 1977, p. 48). As Robert Adams has suggested, given the serious difficulties present in understanding moral properties as natural properties, it is worthwhile taking seriously the hypothesis that morality is not just a nonnatural matter but a supernatural one (Adams 1973, p. 105). For the standard objections against understanding normativity as a nonnatural property concern our inability to say anything further about that nonnatural property itself and about our ability to grasp that property (see, e.g., M. Smith 1994, pp. 21–25). But **if morality is** to be understood **in** terms of **God's commands, we can give an informative account of what these unusual properties are;** and if it is understood in terms of God's commands, then we can give an informative account of how God, being the creator and sustainer of us rational beings, can ensure that we can have an adequate epistemic grasp of the moral domain (Adams 1979a, pp. 137–138). **[Sixth,] Consider** next **the impartiality of morals.** The domain of the moral, unlike the domain of value generally, is governed by the requirements of impartiality. To use Sidgwick's phrase, the point of view of **morality is not one's personal point of view but rather “the point of view … of the Universe”** (Sidgwick 1907, p. 382). But, to remark on the perfectly obvious, the Universe does not have a point of view. Various writers have employed fictions to try to provide some sense to this idea: Adam Smith's impartial and benevolent spectator, Firth's ideal observer, and Rawls' contractors who see the world sub specie aeternitatis come to mind most immediately (Smith 1759, Pt III, Ch 8; Firth 1958; and Rawls 1971, p. 587). But theological **voluntarism can** provide a straightforward understanding of the impartiality of morals by **appeal**ing to the claim **that** the demands of **morality arise[s] from** the demands of **someone who** in fact **has** an **impartial** and supremely deep **love** for all of the beings that are morality's proper objects. **[Seventh,] Consider** next **the overridingness of morals.** The domain of the moral, it is commonly thought, consists in a range of values that can demand absolute allegiance, in the sense that it is never reasonable to act contrary to what those values finally require. One deep difficulty with this view, formulated in a number of ways but perhaps most memorably by Sidgwick (1907, pp. 497–509), is that **it is hard to see how moral value** automatically **trumps other kinds of value** (e.g. prudential value) when they conflict. **But if** the domain of **the moral is** to be understood in terms of **the will of a being who can** make it possible that, or even **ensure that**, **the balance of reasons is always** in favor of acting in accordance with the **moral** demand, **then the overridingness of morals becomes far easier to explain.** Consider next the content of morals. There is a strong case to be made that **[Eighth,] moral judgments** cannot have just any content: they **must be concerned**, somehow, **with** what exhibits **respect for** certain **beings**, or with what promotes their interests (cf. Foot 1958, pp. 510–512; M. Smith 1994, p. 40). Theological **voluntarism has a ready explanation** for the content of morals being what it is: it is that **moral demands arise from a being that loves** that being's **creation.**

Thus the **standard** is **what would Jesus do?**

Ignore skepticism and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Even if I lose that Christianity is the correct theology, WWJD is still the best moral standard.

First, secular ethical theories all reduce to virtue ethics. It’s the only way to make morality motivational. Jason **Kawall 09** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**One** of the **major problem**s **that ethical theories face** today **is to determine the** precise **connection between** the **recognition of ethical dilemmas** by a moral agent **and** his subsequent **motivation to act.** Frequently, philosophers argue, it is not enough for a moral agent to know ethical principles that apply only to universalized situations; something else has to occur for the agent to truly jump into gear. Simply knowing theoretical ethical principles does not provide the agent with the fine-tuned perception necessary to actually recognize a specific situation as deserving of action. This is one of the reasons why rule-based systems of ethics are problematic, as they already assume that the moral agent has discerned ethical salience in a given situation. However, that is not necessarily the case. In other words, knowing that “one should be benevolent to those less fortunate” does not give any specific information as to what action to take when one is faced with a homeless person on the street, for instance. In such a situation, one first has to recognize that the other person has a good of his or her own, is in need, and thus deserving of help. In the same way, the rule does not provide information regarding what form the aid should take: should one simply give the person money for food? Or should one try to help in more profound ways, such as finding him or her a job etc.? All these scenarios already depend on the moral perception of the moral agent; that is, the situation first has to be perceived to be a moral one, for otherwise moral activity is not at all required. As Blum puts it: The point is that perception occurs prior to deliberation, and prior to taking the situation to be one in which one needs to deliberate. It is precisely because the situation is seen in a certain way that the agent takes it as one in which he feels moved to deliberate. 40 Therefore, the significance of moral perception for subsequent action is undeniable. The question now becomes: What is moral perception and how does it develop in a moral agent? Clearly, rules and regulations in and by themselves are not guides to moral perception, since they only prescribe how to act once a moral situation is already perceived as requiring action. **Therefore, deontological and utilitarian theories** of ethics generally **begin too far down the road, as they already presuppose the moral perception of the** moral **agent.** The principles provided can only be applied if the situation has been recognized as a moral one. **However, moral perception appears to be a component of the characteristics** and dispositions **of a person, as they are** an integral **part of how a person** dwells in and **interacts with the world. Thus, moral perception**, which is essential and prior to any moral judgment, **is closely linked to** ethical theories of **virtue, as the virtues** are generally regarded to **shape an agent’s understanding of** his or **her moral environment.**

Fostering virtue requires role models. Therefore, a moral agent ought to emulate virtuous people. Rebecca **Carhart 09** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

Another strength of **virtue ethics** is that it **emphasizes the development of personal character through the** teaching and **practice of virtues. A key component of this process is the imitation of individuals who are recognized as examples of virtuous character.** A pacifist would thus emphasize studying the lives of figures recognized for their peace-promoting standards in order to develop the same positive traits as those people. Different individuals may be upheld as examples of different virtues, and the same may be true for vices. **According to** William **Frankena, the recognition of a moral ideal is critical in motivating one to be a certain kind of person** (1993). One interesting implication of these concepts is a high valuation of history, art, and other disciplines that offer insight into human character. **Considerations of particular people** and whole societies **may lead to an understanding of how actions are shaped by character and values, knowledge that is valuable in making** practical **decisions.**

Jesus is the best role model. He represents the perfection of all virtues.

**Mahatma Gandhi** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

[All ellipses were in the original text.] Love is the strongest force the world possesses. And yet it is the humblest imaginable. The more efficient a force is, the more silent and subtle it is. Love is the subtlest force in the world. **When I read the Sermon on the Mount, especially such passages as ‘Resist not evil,’ I was simply overjoyed** and found my own opinion confirmed where I least expected it. **The message of Jesus Christ**, as I understand it, **is contained in the Sermon on the Mount**… which competes, on almost equal terms, with the Bhagavad Gita for the domination of my heart. It is **that sermon which had endeared Jesus to me. The gentle figure of Christ, so patient, so kind, so loving, so full of forgiveness that he taught his followers not to retaliate when abused** or struck **but to turn the other cheek… it was a beautiful example**, I thought, **of the perfect man.**

Second, practicing religion is key to Eudaimonia. Atheists get all angsty.

**BBC 08** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**A belief in God could lead to a more contented life, research suggests. Religious people are better able to cope with shocks such as losing a job or divorce**, claims the study presented to a Royal Economic Society conference. **Data** from thousands of Europeans **revealed higher levels of "life satisfaction" in believers.** However, researcher Professor Andrew Clark said other aspects of a religious upbringing unrelated to belief may influence future happiness. **This is not the first study to draw links between religion and happiness, with a belief among many psychologists that** some factor in either **belief, or its observance, offer**ing **benefits.** Professor Clark, from the Paris School of Economics, and co-author Dr Orsolya Lelkes from the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, used information from household surveys to analyse the attitudes of Christians - both Catholic and Protestant - not only to their own happiness, but also to issues such as unemployment. Their **findings**, they said, **suggest**ed **that religion could offer a "buffer" which protected from life's disappointments.**

I contend that Jesus would value rehabilitation above retribution.

First, the Pope wants rehab. **Catholic World News 12** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

**The criminal-justice system must strive to rehabilitate convicts** as well as to punish them, **Pope Benedict** XVI **said** in an address to a group of European prison officials. "In order to practice justice it is not enough that those found guilty of crimes be simply punished: it is necessary that in punishing them, everything possible be done to correct and improve them,” the Pope said. “When this does not happen, justice is not done in an integral sense.” In fact, the Pontiff continued, **a prison system** that punishes criminals **without providing for rehab**ilitation “**paradoxically reinforces** rather than overcomes **the tendency to commit crime** and the threat posed to society by the individual.” At a time when crime rates are rising in many societies, **the Pope said**, **prison systems should do their utmost to “bring about the offender’s** effective **re-education, which is required** both **for** the sake of **his own dignity** and with a view to his reintegration into society.”

The Pope is infallible on the matter of interpreting Jesus’s teachings – multiple warrants. **CA 04** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

Given these common misapprehensions regarding the basic tenets of papal infallibility, it is necessary to explain exactly what infallibility is not. Infallibility is not the absence of sin. Nor is it a charism that belongs only to the pope. Indeed, infallibility also belongs to the body of bishops as a whole, when, in doctrinal unity with the pope, they solemnly teach a doctrine as true. We have this from **Jesus himself**, who **promised the apostles and their successors the bishops**, the magisterium of the Church: **"He who hears you hears me"** (Luke 10:16), **and "Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven"** (Matt. 18:18). Vatican II’s Explanation Vatican II explained the doctrine of infallibility as follows: "**Although** the individual **bishops do not enjoy** the prerogative of **infallibility, they can** nevertheless **proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly**. This is so, **even when** they are **dispersed around the world**, provided that while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with Peter’s successor, and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively. This authority is even more clearly verified when, gathered together in an ecumenical council, they are teachers and judges of faith and morals for the universal Church. Their definitions must then be adhered to with the submission of faith" (Lumen Gentium 25). **Infallibility belongs in a special way to the pope as head of the bishops** (Matt. 16:17–19; John 21:15–17). As Vatican II remarked, it is a charism the pope "enjoys in virtue of his office, when, as the supreme shepherd and teacher of all the faithful, who confirms his brethren in their faith (Luke 22:32), he proclaims by a definitive act some doctrine of faith or morals. Therefore **his definitions**, of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church, **are** justly held **irreformable, for they are pronounced with** the **assistance of the Holy Spirit, an assistance promised to him in blessed Peter." The infallibility of the pope** is not a doctrine that suddenly appeared in Church teaching; rather, it is a doctrine which **was implicit in the early Church. It is** only our understanding of infallibility which has developed and been more clearly understood over time. In fact, the doctrine of infallibility is **implicit in** these Petrine texts: **John 21**:15–17 ("Feed my sheep . . . "), **Luke 22**:32 ("I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail"), **and Matthew 16**:18 ("You are Peter . . . ").

Historical consistency confirms the Pope’s infallibility. **CA 2** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

Knox wrote to Arnold Lunn (a future convert who would become a great apologist for the faith—their correspondence is found in the book Difficulties): **"Has it ever occurred to you how few are the alleged ‘failures of infallibility’?** I mean, **if somebody propounded** in your presence the thesis **that all the kings of England have been impeccable, you would not find yourself murmuring,** ‘Oh, **well,** people said rather unpleasant things about Jane Shore . . . and **the best historians seem to think that Charles II spent too much** of his **time with Nell Gwynn.’** Here have these **popes [have] been, fulminating anathema after anathema for centuries—certain in all human probability to contradict themselves or one another over again. Instead** of which **you get this measly crop of two or three alleged failures!"** While Knox’s observation does not establish the truth of papal infallibility, it does show that **the historical argument against infallibility is weak.**

Second, Jesus’ love is unconditional and doesn’t demand retribution.

**Franklin 10** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

I am amazed and in awe when I think about the love of Jesus. **Jesus' love is not like human love.** Jesus love for me and for you is unlike any other love that we have and will ever experience. **Jesus love for you and me compelled him to step down out of** the comfort of **heaven and enter** into **this world.** Jesus love compelled him to do for us what we could not do for ourselves. **Jesus love compelled him to dine with sinners, offer** his **forgiveness freely,** heal the sick, touch the leper **and** be **associate**d **with people that others would have nothing to do with.** Jesus love compelled him to take on sin and death. His love compelled him to lay down his life for all humanity. His love compelled him to reach out to the thief on the cross next to him. **The love of Jesus cried out "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." The love of Jesus cried out, "let he who is without sin cast the first stone."** The love of Jesus cries out, "fear not for I am with you." **Jesus love is not a love that holds grudges or requires retribution.** Jesus love does not require a love you in return. Jesus just loves you and me. And he said the way that others will know that we are his followers are by our love. By God's grace, as we follow Jesus, **our love should become more like his**. Our love for others, our forgiveness, our willingness to lay down our lives for others grows **because that is what the love of Jesus does.**

Third, rehabilitation is most consistent with God’s love because it expresses love for the sinner.

**Jennings 12** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

**Retribution** is a concept of the immature. It does no good to those offended, it doesn’t resurrect the murdered person, it doesn’t heal the broken bone, and it doesn't restore one’s innocence or recover stolen goods. It also **doesn’t** heal, develop, **save**, **or transform the sinner**/criminal. Utilitarianism, which I will call **Rehabilitation**, **is focused on protecting** both society from the criminal and **the criminal from damaging themselves by continued actions in violation of God’s design** for life. **Each act of selfishness** actually **damages the sinner, searing the conscience**, warping the character, **and hardening the heart**. Putting someone in prison, where they are forced to cease their destructive behavior, can provide an opportunity for reflection, reevaluation, and rehabilitation, while also protecting the innocent. However, allowing one to continue on destructive rampages not only harms society, but ensures the eventual eternal destruction of the criminal. **So, in a world of sin, governments act in redemptive ways by intervening in the lives of those who**, when they commit crimes, **are violating the principles of love**, of going good for their fellow 'man.' Arrest, prosecution and appropriate punishments are stand-in consequences, like spanking for playing in the road, intended to teach the person that such behaviors are damaging and destructive, while simultaneously protecting society. Incarceration may result in rehabilitation for some, but for others who have persisted in destructive living so long they have permanently destroyed the faculties that respond to love and truth, they put themselves beyond rehabilitation and incarceration becomes the earthly means of limiting the extent of individual destructive behavior. So, my answer is that a loving person seeks the most effective means of making society a truly safe place. And what would be the safest society? One filled with many prisons, guards, police at every corner? Or a society filled with people who love others more than self and would rather die than hurt another? **While incarceration is sadly a necessity** in the world in which we live, **to the degree we can rehabilitate people** such that they actually become mature individuals who respect the rights of others, **we have done more good for society than retribution ever can.** As Gandhi, speaking of retribution, said, “An eye for an eye and the entire world will go blind.” **Let us incarcerate with hearts that love the criminal, that want to see the person redeemed, saved, and restored,** or if that is not possible, then to see that they are kept from doing more harm. Consider, what you would want if the criminal was your first born son or daughter? – **for we are all God’s children and He wants to heal us all.**

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

I’m willing to clarify or alter my advocacy in cross-ex if neg asks.

Neg burden is to defend offense to a competitive advocacy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 08** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

Truth-testing devolves into offense-defense. The words in the topic prove it’s a question of offense-defense. Two reasons:

1. “Resolved” means “firmly determined to **do** something,”[[17]](#footnote-17) so “Resolved” statements are always questions of what to do, not what to believe. Therefore, negating the truth of a resolved statement means proving that we shouldn’t do that action.

2. Oxford Dictionary defines[[18]](#footnote-18) “Affirm” as

**declare one’s support for**; uphold **or defend**:the referendum affirmed the republic’s right to secede

Therefore, affirming the topic is equivalent to endorsing it as an advocacy.

Finally, the neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC. Independently, conditionality is a violation of the standard. Jesus’ love was unconditional, so the neg’s love for his advocacy should be, too.

Maybe useful in the future somehow

**Schwager 94**[[19]](#footnote-19)

A person grows, for better or for worse, by imitating others, that is, by living the way others live. **Christians are called to imitate Christ,** to be like him, **to possess the same** character and **virtues that Jesus** Christ **had**. This is not something we can achieve by our own efforts, but **by cooperating with God's grace**. To be like Christ, to grow **in** Christ-like virtues, requires that we become part of **a community that practices Christian virtues.** Christians need a community of a particular kind to live well morally. Since the Christian church is called to be a holy community, **we need** to be a **people** capable of being **faithful to a way of life, even when that** way of life is in **conflict[s] with what passes as "morality" in** the larger **society.** Christians cannot be morally autonomous, but must be willing to belong to a community which is committed to worshipping God and to living a Godly way of life. Christians are called to be a certain kind of people, a people of Godly character who live virtuous lives, and who shine as lights in a darkened world, pointing the way to the kingdom of God. As Jesus says in his Sermon on the Mount: **You are the light of the world.** A city on a hill cannot be hidden. Neither do people light a lamp and put in under a bowl. Instead they put it on a stand, and it gives light to everyone in the house. In the same way, **let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven.** (Matthew 5:14-16)

## AT Problem of Evil

Free will explains why humans suffer. **Strobel 12**[[20]](#footnote-20)

This answers the question you hear so often: **"Why didn't God** merely **create a world where** tragedy and **suffering didn't exist?"** The answer is: **He did! Genesis 1**:31 **says: "God saw all that he had made, and it was** very **good."**

But if God is not the author of tragedy or evil or death, where did they come from? Well, God has existed from eternity past as the Father, Son and Spirit, together in a relationship of perfect love. So love is the highest value in the universe. And **when God** decided to **create[d] human beings, he wanted us to experience love.** But to give us the ability to love, **God had to give us free will** to decide whether to love or not to love. Why? **Because love always involves** a **choice.**

**If we were programmed to say, "I love you," it wouldn't really be love.** When my daughter was little, she had a doll with a string in the back, and when you pulled it the doll said, "I love you." Did that doll love my daughter? Of course not. It was programmed to say those words. To really experience love, that doll would need to have been able to choose to love or not to love. Again – real love always involves a choice.

So in order for us to experience love, God bestowed on us free will. But **unfortunately,** we **humans have abused** our **free will by rejecting God and walking away from Him. And that** has **resulted in** the introduction of two kinds of evil into the world: **moral evil** and natural evi**l.**

## AT Evolution

The Pope says evolution can coexist with Christianity. **Reuters 7** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

**Pope Benedict** XVI **said** the debate raging in some countries — particularly the United States and his native Germany — between creationism and evolution was an “absurdity,” saying **that evolution can coexist with faith.**

**The pontiff**, speaking as he was concluding his holiday in northern Italy, also **said that** while there is much scientific proof to support evolution, **the theory could not exclude a role by God.**

“They are presented as alternatives that exclude each other,” the pope said. “This clash is an absurdity because on one hand there is much scientific proof in favor of evolution, which appears as a reality that we must see and which enriches our understanding of life and being as such.”

**He said evolution did not answer** all **the question**s**:** “Above all it does not answer the great philosophical question, **‘Where does everything come from?’”**

Benedict also said the human race must listen to “the voice of the Earth” or risk destroying its very existence.

Give this 100% truth-value since the Pope is infallible on religious issues – That’s CA 4.

## AT Excludes Gays

The Bible doesn’t justify excluding homosexuals. **Shore 12**[[22]](#footnote-22)

**The Bible**'s clobber **passages were written about same-sex acts between *heterosexual* persons**, and do not address the subject of homosexual acts between a committed gay couple, because **the concept of** a person **being** a **homosexual did not exist at the time the Bible was written.** It is also critical to our reading of the New Testament's three clobber passages to understand that while of course Paul knew about sex acts that took place between persons of the same gender, he had no concept whatsoever of homosexual persons. Virtually no one in Paul's time was "out"; no one lived, or in any way publicly self-identified, as a homosexual. Paul had no concept of an entire population of people who, as a fundamental, unalterable condition of their existence, were sexually attracted to persons of the same gender, and *not* sexually attracted to persons of the opposite gender. Here is the opening of the OCD's article on homosexuality: "No Greek or Latin word corresponds to the modern term 'homosexuality,' and ancient Mediterranean society did not in practice treat homosexuality as a socially operating category of personal or public life. Sexual relations between persons of the same sex certainly did occur (they are widely attested in ancient sources), but they were not systematically distinguished or conceptualized as such, much less were they thought to represent a single, homogeneous phenomenon in contradistinction to sexual relations between persons of different sexes. ... The application of 'homosexuality' (and 'heterosexuality') in a substantive or normative sense to sexual expression in classical antiquity is not advised." We can be confident that **Paul was not writing** to, or **about**, **gay people**, because he simply *could not have been*, **any more than he could have written about** smart phones or **iPads.** We do not know what Paul might write or say today about gay people. All we know is that in **the New Testament** he wrote about promiscuous, predatory, non-consensual same-sex acts between *heterosexuals*. If we are to rely on the Bible, then we must take its text as it is. It does condemn homosexual (and heterosexual) sex that is excessive, exploitive and outside of marriage. It **does *not****,*however, **address** the state of **homosexuality itself -- much less** the subject of **homosexual acts between a married gay couple.** Christians therefore have no Bible-based moral justification for themselves condemning such acts. Because there was no concept of gay marriage when the Bible was written, the Bible does not, and could not, address the sinfulness of homosexual acts done *within* the context of gay marriage. The Bible routinely, clearly and strongly classifies *all* sex acts outside of the bonds of marriage as sinful. But, because there was no concept of gay people when the Bible was written, the Bible does not, and could not, address the sinfulness of homosexual acts done *within* the context of marriage. Christians therefore have no biblical basis for themselves condemning such acts. In fact, by denying marriage equality to gay people, Christians are compelling gay couples *to* sin, because their intimacy must happen outside of marriage, and is therefore, by biblical definition, sinful.

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